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ABSTRACT

Papers presented at a March 1977 workshop that examined issues raised by the participation of academic humanists and other humanistically oriented academics in policy research and teaching are provided. Section I contains three background papers: "The Humanist, Technology, and Policy Studies," by Joseph W. Slade; "The Relevance of the Humanities to the Policy-Making Process," by Robert J. Baum; and "Comprehensive Evaluation Research and Its Dependence on Both Humanistic and Empiricist Perspectives," by Thomas D. Cook and Fay Lomax Cook. Section II includes 11 papers prepared by George Washington University faculty and administrators that describe particular degree programs, report on specific courses in the policy field, and provide personal statements by faculty who have been involved in this academic area. (SPG)

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Humanists and Policy Studies

**Relevance Revisited:
Curriculum Development
in the Humanities**

No. III

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**George Washington University
Division of Experimental Programs
Washington, D.C.**

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**RELEVANCE REVISITED:
CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT
IN THE HUMANITIES**

A SERIES OF REPORTS ON FOUR WORKSHOPS

**CLARENCE C. MONDALE
GENERAL EDITOR**

RELEVANCE REVISITED: CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT IN THE HUMANITIES is a series of reports on four workshops held by the Division of Experimental Programs, George Washington University and supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities.

There are four numbers in the series:

- No. I Service, Learning and Individual Development**
- No. II Administrative Strategies for Curriculum Change**
- No. III Humanists and Policy Studies**
- No. IV Local Studies and Experiential Education**

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HUMANISTS AND POLICY STUDIES

RODERICK S. FRENCH, EDITOR

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 1977

INTRODUCTION

Academic humanists, with considerable encouragement from the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), are beginning to entertain two unfamiliar ideas. The first is that they share interests among themselves that transcend departmental loyalties. The second is that their professional interests include concern for the directions of curriculum change and development in their home institutions--in the humanities and as the humanities relate to general education and to institutional mission. It is one thing to entertain the unfamiliar ideas. It is another to know what to do with them. We hope that this series of four reports, having to do with the practical implications of those ideas at conventional institutions of higher learning, may contribute to more informed discussion among colleagues sharing our concerns.

Over an eight-year period, the George Washington University, with the support of NEH, has been involved in a major program in institutional development in the humanities. The GW program emphasized "alternative" approaches to liberal education: field-study; work-study; issue-oriented courses; policy studies. The program attempted to make our curriculum more directly responsive to student interests and community needs. Over the years, a host of experimental courses and programs were launched, with interestingly mixed results. As of June 1977, NEH support for the GW program terminates. A small follow-up grant from NEH has made it possible for us to offer a series of four workshops on topics of particular concern to our program, as a means of reflecting upon our experiences in company with interested colleagues throughout this region of the country. That same grant provided for this series of reports.

The four workshops featured presentations by guests of national reputation and participation by educators from throughout this region and from GW. The first workshop addressed issues related to making work-placement part of liberal education. The second discussed a range of administrative strategies for effecting curricular change. The third reviewed attempts at GW and elsewhere to involve humanists in the study of public policy. The final workshop assessed the growing interest in making local materials the subject of study in the humanities.

The structure of these four reports reflects the structure of the workshops themselves. They were held at the Airlie Conference Center, Warrenton, Virginia. They lasted one day, beginning on Friday afternoon and concluding at noon on Saturday. They included plenary sessions devoted to presentations by our guest speakers, review of the GW activities in reference to short working papers developed by GW participants, and small-group discussion of general issues of interest to participants. Each of these reports includes papers by the guest speakers, the GW working papers and a summary of issues raised in the small-group discussions.

C.M.

PREFACE

The growth of policy studies education at George Washington University is a reflection of both national and local developments. According to The Chronicle of Higher Education, enrollment in graduate policy studies programs increased by 65 percent in a recent two-year period. The explanations for this rising interest must be as complex as the programs are varied. At George Washington University, policy-oriented academic programs enable students and faculty to put the university's Washington location to optimum use.

In the 1970's some six specific graduate degree programs have been established at GW, not to mention the emergence of individual policy-related courses. The substantive policy areas addressed by the degree programs include education, the legislative process, science and technology, health and environment. The emergence of these curricula was concurrent with and often reinforced by a major institutional development initiative funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities. In the proposal originally submitted to NEH, the university had stated its desire to explore "the interrelation of professional, technical and humane perspectives" on matters of contemporary concern. The NEH grant has been used over the last six years to encourage academic humanists to relate their teaching and research to the analysis of the development and impact of governmental policies in selected areas of public life.

As one of a series of four workshops based on GW's experiences in its institutional development program, a two-day meeting was held in March 1977 on the topic of "Humanists and Policy Studies." The announcement simply stated that the workshop would examine issues raised by the participation of academic humanists and other humanistically oriented academics in policy research and teaching. Both those involved with established programs and those in the process of developing courses and curricula were invited to participate. There was a great diversity of trainings and interests represented among those who responded to this broad statement of the topic of the workshop. (A list of all participants and their affiliations can be found at the back of this report.)

This report of the meeting is divided into three sections. In the first, the three background papers are reproduced in full and without modification as they were presented to the workshop. The second section consists of the short working papers prepared by the participants from GW. The final section provides a brief summary of some of the major points of discussion.

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THE HUMANIST, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY STUDIES

Joseph W. Slade*

Until quite recently, the average humanist--the literary scholar, the philosopher, the historian, the fine arts specialist, even the sociologist of the "softer" type, if he may be classed with the others--has frequently felt threatened by academic, cultural, and political developments which seemed to have outstripped his capacity to deal with them. That sense of impotence is not limited to humanists, but the fear of obsolescence affected with particular poignancy those long assumed to be arbiters of personal and cultural values. Usually the humanist construed the menace as technological, and again his discontent resembled that of many citizens, but his was also fed by professional factors: the tumultuous charges of irrelevance of the last decade, the declining enrollments of this one, the poor or indifferent funding of the liberal arts, the new emphasis on vocational training, the sustained status of the sciences, as opposed to diminished regard for the humanities, and so on. The humanist's alienation was in some measure his own fault; too often, convinced that he was the sole custodian of high culture, he withdrew into his discipline, from whence he sneered at the machine-loving barbarians of modernity. Because he found himself on the edge of ferment, from his point of view the center could not hold, and he fulminated against an unholy technological alliance of administrators, scientists, and proponents of mass culture, within and without his university. More than a little of his asperity still surfaces in faculty meeting across the country.

Ironically, the humanist's resistance came at a time when his expertise was needed most. In some respects he was like the shocked librarian suddenly confronted with the suggestion that he install data retrieval systems among his bookstacks: everybody wanted his knowledge, but faster than he was accustomed to giving it. The librarian knew where the books were, just as the humanist knew how to track values to their source, but what was the hurry? For the humanist unwilling to retreat yet unused to such urgency, participation in events was hardly satisfactory. His method was to advance humanistic values, sometimes with such earnestness and such seemingly remote bearing on a given situation that policy makers aware of technological acceleration rejected them in favor of solutions that appeared practical or quick. In his turn the humanist was too ready to believe that the policy-makers were unconcerned with the moral implications of technological decisions, with the result, once again, that the humanist slipped into the role of

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adversary. Both humanist and policy-maker suffered. The impasse was doubly unfortunate, however, for the humanist is a technologist himself, a very sophisticated one. As such, he is a reliable resource. It is time that both he and the policy-makers--and the policy student--understand that fact. Trying to define technology is like trying to define pornography: everyone is sure he knows it when he sees it, yet untangling it from its context is virtually impossible. On one level technology is simply the science of the practical or industrial arts. On another it is more amorphous, more culturally pervasive, and depending on the viewer, progressive or regressive, good or evil. For some technology is a *zeitgeist*, a force beyond man's direction, morally neutral, or, as humanists have been fond of characterizing it, "soulless." For others it is "technique," subject to man's control, although its consequences, good or ill, are not always predictable. The confusion, of course, afflicts us all, and is what makes policy study so difficult and so necessary--assuming, to be sure, that technology is not beyond man's control--in the university and the world outside it. One thing is certain: no matter what we call our era, post-industrial or technetronic, technology is the dominant factor of modernity, however we label the other variables. Technology's relationship to planning and decision-making, in virtually any sphere, is crucial. In a sense technology is the relationship, since we have learned that in our society everything is related to everything else. Policy studies as a discipline rests on precisely this acknowledgement of interrelatedness. What happens in one area affects other areas, so that plans and choices, whether they involve management of resources or local political options, must take many variables into account. Policy study is a commitment to ideas but not necessarily a commitment to the rightness of specific ideas, and it is heavily informed by technological method.

Now whatever else technology might be, it is principally a system, or systems, of organized practical knowledge, of information. Inasmuch as modern electronic systems--such as computers and televisions--are literally energized by information, technology can be discussed, if one chooses, in near-metaphysical terms, and it is worth remarking that such notions spring from the work of those humanists who pioneered in the formulation of post-industrial theory. Arnold Toynbee, for example, coined the phrase "industrial revolution," another historian, Lewis Mumford, detailed the phases of technics, Alfred North Whitehead, a philosopher, insisted that science and technology could be warmed by humanism, and Marshall McLuhan, a literary scholar, first made evident the extent to which technologies alter human consciousness. Mindful of these contributions, other humanists are expanding them with hard data. In the process the humanist has been learning that technology is at least as humanizing as it is dehumanizing, and he has been learning it on occasion from unexpected quarters. When a teacher says that machines dominate man or rob him of his dignity in an evening class full of computer technicians who have spent the day writing programs for hospitals, the controversy will be educational more for the instructor than for the students.

Were he to realize it, and he seems belatedly to be doing so, the humanist is also a programmer, something that IBM has already recognized. That corporation frequently hires English majors, for instance, because of their conceptual skills and their literacy with languages natural and

artificial. Only now is the academic humanist remembering that his advanced degrees attest not so much to his knowledge of a particular field as to his competence to do research, ruthlessly if necessary, which is exactly the method by which many dissertations are completed. In this regard, more than is the case with the research scientist whose focus is narrow, the humanist is--almost by definition--a generalist. By the time he has finished his training the humanist of any specialization will have amassed information from many diverse corners. He will have constructed a model in the most modern sense: the literary scholar might have fastened on a genre, the historian on a period, the philosopher on a political system. If those models are not always as rigorous or as mathematically controlled as those in the sciences, they are potentially all the more valuable in that they are subject to the kinds of cultural influences that so bedevil policy studies today. In constructing his model, the humanist must isolate and evaluate variables of great complexity. In short, he is an information processor, a sorter and an organizer, and a better one than most. Aside from his value judgements and historical perspectives, then, the humanist possesses very practical talents that, addressed to specific topics, can have wide application. Moreover, the task of reassimilating him into the modern university, or of admitting him as a properly functioning participant in policy studies, is made easier by the growing awareness that the shaping and designing of information are themselves moral statements, means of creating values, through organization, for political, intellectual, and spiritual purposes. So great is the flood of information in our society at present that we are prey to the illusion that we are in control of events. As a generalist, the humanist has the responsibility of scrutinizing information carefully, and of integrating knowledge both for its own sake and for its utility. In the meantime, he has to overcome, and seems to be overcoming, two traditional obstacles.

The first has to do with the humanist's prejudice against the engineer, be he the standard hard-skills type (civil, mechanical, etc.) or the social engineer (like the political statistician or the city planner) of more recent vintage, both of whom he resembles. Rather significantly, Daniel Bell, in describing "The Structure of the Knowledge Society" that he foresees in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, lumps engineers and the professorate in a middle tier, below the creative scientists and top professional administrators. Leaving aside the tantalizing implications of that mandarin upper class, we can perceive that the affinities between engineers and professors, humanists as well as others, are not strained. Like the engineer, the professor is a designer, a planner, a technician, and a manager of the courses he teaches and the information he disseminates; he merely uses different models. The congruence is perhaps one reason why interdisciplinary humanistic programs enjoy a high rate of success at engineering schools. Somewhat parenthetically, humanists and engineers share certain attitudes. Both seem jealous of the status and glamor accorded the "pure" scientist. Apparently in response, Harvard has changed the name of its engineering school to the School of Applied Science, with corresponding curriculum changes, and other universities are following suit, just as humanists have tried to upgrade their image by emphasizing their roles as researchers. Older civil engineers now complain that younger ones are no longer required to learn drafting, an accusation analogous to the charge that humanists no longer teach basic skills like writing. Not surprisingly, shifting

orientations has its drawbacks. And when that older engineer insists that his colleagues must use "dirty models," must grapple with the hard, utilitarian work of design, the humanist should listen too.

The second obstacle has to do with the humanist's prejudice against mass culture. Technology--information spread through communications networks of all sorts, from publishing to CB radios--has broken down distinctions between high culture and low, between public sector and private, between academic sphere and popular, and the humanist is gradually drawing on data from all these areas in his work. Video and Film, American Studies, and Popular Culture programs are moves in this direction, but more important is the humanist's increased willingness to experiment within his discipline and to mount interdisciplinary courses.

Some years ago, John Fischer of Harper's Magazine reacted to then current demands for "relevance" by proposing a model university he called "Survival U."--a policy student's dream. In this school every course was to be devoted to ecological and/or technological questions and to formulating public policy on a cross-disciplinary basis, in order, as Fischer put it, that the planet would survive. Attractive though the idea was, the atmosphere of crisis has muted since. Besides, so unilateral a scheme might suppress the legitimate goals of multidisciplinary branches of learning and forestall intellectual serendipity. In the absence of so far-reaching a reorganization, the alternative for the policy student who wishes to draw on the humanist's competence is usually the interdisciplinary approach within fairly specific frameworks.

One can make too much of interdisciplinary studies, which are not always the panaceas they are supposed to be. Logistics can count for more than content, and wrestling with funding, the personality conflicts of instructors (if more than one), released time, media aids, and visiting lecturers can be exhausting. Worse, institutional experience is of often anecdotal and of no real help to another institution. (Fortunately, the NEH National Humanities Institutes, such as the one at the University of Chicago on Humanities and Technology, are training humanists in the planning of such courses. The NEH will utilize these Fellows as a national network of advisors for other schools.) Some universities and some departments stretch easily while others do not. Boundaries can be rigid or flexible, depending on the discipline and the instructors, and to talk of "transcending" limitations is sometimes to engage in rhetoric. Moreover, a thorough interdisciplinary attack on any subject can be mustered only from highly individualized expertise and a good deal of sweat. Should a scholar want to investigate the relationships between science and literature, he must do more than parade words like dyads, parameters, and interfaces. And that, of course, is how the question boils down: how much does the humanist have to know in order to be of use in an interdisciplinary matrix like policy studies? Granted that he is good at processing and organizing information, what kinds of information can he be expected to deal with? It would be nice if the policy-minded humanist could master Rene Thom's catastrophe theory for predicting discontinuous events, but he does not have to go that far. Now that the intersections of planes of inquiry are becoming more visible, the humanist is being led--nay, pushed--along paths which lead outward from his own specialty. To pursue them does not require retraining, but

it does require refining and extending the knowledge he has into related fields. He really has no option.

By way of generalizing further, we might note that modern philosophers have forceful commitments to linguistics and mathematics, that they can forge easy and natural links with medicine and the biological sciences, particularly in the realm of ethics, that they merge at many junctures with the theoretical sciences and with social engineering, that they have long been drawn to politics, all areas which figure, or should figure, in policy studies. We can point out that artists in recent years have worked with machines, physical concepts, found art, computer graphics, information storage, environmental and city planning, architecture, the psychological effects of space and design, video, film, sound, and a dozen other "hard" technologies, many of which are of practical consideration for the policy planner. To avoid prolixity, we can restrict the contributions of historians to one small, incipient, but rapidly swelling subdiscipline, the history of technology, and to the related establishment of museums of technology, both of which developments are forcing the rewriting of the past of our culture, with consequences for the present and the future. Like the philosopher and the artist, such a historian must and does know a great deal about subjects outside his normal purview. The chronicle of industry and technology connects with economics, politics, social studies, the natural sciences, literature, art--and policy studies.

Finally, to give substance to the claim that the humanist's ability to manage information has utility, let us concentrate on one particular discipline, the one most often taxed with irrelevance, English. A contemporary Department of English--the trend is toward renaming it, or combining it with other areas under the title Department of Communications, an excellent illustration of discipline stretching--at a university of medium size is likely to include instructors with good to splendid grounding in some or all of the following specialties: basic writing, creative, business, and scientific writing, folklore/anthropology, rhetoric, literary genres, historical literary periods (English and American, in profusion), foreign literatures in translation, the history of oral, print, and electronic cultures, film video, popular culture, American Studies, print and broadcast journalism, linguistics, communication theory, and possibly cybernetics. The linkages with other disciplines are numerous, and not always manifest, such as those between linguistics, cybernetics, and communication theory and the physical and biological sciences. Rather than enumerate them, however, we can confine ourselves to several specific problems of interest to the policy student, around which could be built interdisciplinary courses, or which could simply be made part of the agenda of a policy group. Let us leave aside questions like Land Use, Limits to Growth, Biomedical Ethics, Recombinant DNA, Nuclear Energy, Laws of the Sea and similar large scale topics, although it would be a mistake to assume the English professor could add nothing to those discussions, and limit ourselves to clearly germane technological subjects. Let us further ignore the most obvious, like the recent revision of the Copyright Law, still being amended, in favor of (1) the still simmering controversy over the UNESCO Guidelines for Direct Satellite Broadcasting, (2) the upcoming revision of the U. S. Communications Act, and (3) the potential impact of the soon to be marketed video disc system.

(1) On November 15, 1972, a resolution of the 17th General Conference of UNESCO affirmed that national sovereignty should prevail in respect to Direct Satellite Broadcasting, and asserted among other things that each nation had the right to determine the content of programs broadcast to it, to require prior consent, and to insist that broadcasters respect cultural distinctions and the laws of the individual countries. The vote was 55 to 7, 22 countries abstaining, with the Soviet Union and Third World nations for, the United States against. Our policy group wishes to evaluate U. S. policy, and asks the English professor for a report. Probably he has not the slightest idea of how a satellite is launched, let alone the height of a geostationary orbit (22,300 miles), but he will know, because he has studied the history of oral, print, and electronic stages, just what sort of cultural disruption less developed countries fear, the effects on national boundaries of wide dissemination of information, the potentials for propaganda. He will have to weigh the benefits of rapid electronic links and the freedom of communication against the rights of nations to preserve their customs or merely to be paranoid, and he will be able to collect published reports on places like Indonesia which have satellite systems in operation. At some point he will have to deal with economics and the legalities implicit in the technology. His conclusions, his judgements, as reflected in the information he shapes, may be at variance with those of the political scientists, sociologists, lawyers, and economists who may sit in on the policy group, but the data are within his grasp, and his opinion will be informed.

(2) Because of the rise of pay and cable TV, the invention of lasers and optical fibers, the perfecting of satellite broadcasting at far cheaper rates than direct or microwave ground systems, the clamor of businessmen with computers for high-speed data transmission, and the development of hardware companies in competition with AT&T, several Congressional committees are rewriting the 1934 Communications Act. The lobbying is intense. Were the English professor requested to comment to our policy group, none of the technicalities would be beyond his comfortable understanding--except, ironically, the writing of the law itself, which is probably beyond anyone's understanding. Should he have a background in communications theory, video, popular culture, journalism, business writing, oral, print, and electronic history, or related expertise, he could estimate the cultural, economic, political, and social effects of continuing AT&T's monopoly or giving a share of the market to her competition in business communication, or assess the claims of UHF versus VHF stations and those of pay and cable TV versus the commercial networks. Information from all sides is available in near-incredible mass: the problem is how to understand it, for the issue is really a democratic society. Considering that he is a communications expert, who is better qualified than the English teacher?

(3) While at first it was heralded as new home entertainment, the video disc promises much more. The laser-read disc contains 54,000 frames on a 12-inch side, any one of which can be randomly retrieved by remote control, so that the entire Encyclopedia Britannica can be encoded on disc, then read on a home TV screen page by page or in any order. Picture and sound reproduction is of high quality. Moreover, the system is fully interactive with computers, and each disc can hold 200 times the information of a magnetic tape disc. No unit is on the market yet,

but the federal government has already ordered large-scale systems for study. Our policy group asks the English professor to speculate on the short- and long-term effects of this revolutionary technology on the printing, recording data retrieval, and broadcast industries, on libraries and educational institutions, on copyright regulations and democratic communication. While no one without a crystal ball can answer those questions, not to mention others, the English professor, in cooperation with other policy students, can put together a comprehensive scenario.

Still, the humanist can not be all things to all policy students. That is part of his value. When everything has been said, he still has a duty to preserve the past, to remind his fellows of values, to extract new meanings from the artifacts of our civilization. But those responsibilities are not in conflict with the assistance he can render in the realm of the eminently practical, especially when it is so needed. As a specialist, the humanist can evolve; as a generalist, he can synthesize. Those are important attributes in a technological society. Better yet, he is available.

THE RELEVANCE OF THE HUMANITIES TO THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS

Robert J. Baum*

There are a number of academics, particularly in the humanities (and the "pure" sciences), who at every opportunity speak out against their colleagues whom they perceive as trying to make their disciplines "relevant" to this, that or the other thing. They assert that the humanities are of substantial intrinsic value, and should be pursued for this reason. Although the title of my paper may suggest the possibility of conflict with such a position, the theses to be presented herein are in fact quite compatible with it.

In brief, I agree that it is absurd to try to make the humanities relevant to any other aspect of human experience, but only because they already are relevant to all areas of human experience. We cannot make them relevant, but we can (and should) seek out and discover the ways in which the humanities do in fact relate to specific realms of personal and social activities. (The identification of these relations, I shall subsequently argue, is itself a central task for the humanities scholar.) I also agree that the humanities should be pursued for their intrinsic worth, but I will go on to argue that this must not prevent us from recognizing (and publicizing) their very real and diverse utilitarian values. One aspect of human experience to which the humanities have significant, but generally unrecognized, relevance is the area of policy-making. In the space and time presently available I can only sketch out a partial outline of this relation and identify a few of the most important steps which humanities scholars should take to make this relation more explicit and to increase the contributions of the humanities to the policy process.

A huge literature on "policy analysis," "decision theory" and related topics has developed over the last several decades. It is now almost a new discipline, with a number of specialized journals and Ph.D. programs. Its leaders come primarily from the fields of economics, political science, cybernetics, management, law and engineering, with little or no representation from the humanities disciplines. Insofar as the realm of policy studies has been defined by social scientists and others outside of the humanities, it is not at all surprising that their definition includes little if any recognition of any place for contributions to the policy process (or to the study of the process) from the humanities. This, then, is the first basic task to be addressed by

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humanities scholars--to critique the currently espoused definition of the field and identify the points at which input from their disciplines is essential to the policy-making process. The following sketch is not intended to be more than suggestive of what a careful analysis of the field might find to be significant relations of the humanities to the policy process.

Decision-making in general, and policy-making in particular, is a complex activity. The decision/policy-maker normally should gather a broad range of factual information from a wide variety of sources. He/she must then analyze this data thoroughly, and should also attempt to consider the specific decision to be made in the context of different perspectives. At every phase of this process, knowledge and/or skills from the various humanities disciplines are essential ingredients, and insofar as they are lacking, the end results are less valid and more threatening to the general welfare than if the decisions were made on the basis of less "hard" data. (This judgment itself is of course based on one of the fundamental truths accepted by most humanities scholars--that all human decisions must necessarily be made on the basis of inadequate factual information, and that wisdom consists in part at least of the ability to make the best possible judgment while recognizing the limitations of the human condition.) But it is necessary to be more specific in defense of this assertion.

The tasks of information gathering, analysis, and viewing problems from different perspectives are not separable in practice (and probably not even in theory), nor can they be performed in any uniform sequential manner. The various components are intimately connected and intertwined, and the kind of overall synthesis which is required to bring all the parts together is one that is more commonly associated with the humanities than with the social or natural sciences. Providing such a unifying overview was of course one of the primary responsibilities of Plato's philosopher king.

I do not mean to suggest that the modern-day decision-maker should hold empirical data in such disdain as Plato did, but the modern humanist does have a responsibility to provide a reasoned challenge to any and all "hard" data presented by scientists and others as bases for policy decisions. Such data need not only be assessed for technical accuracy by experts in the specific technical fields involved, but it should also be assessed in terms of its relevance and appropriateness to the policy issues at hand. Not only are policy-makers sometimes swamped or buried under enormous quantities of irrelevant and/or inappropriate data, but they are sometimes also not provided with certain available data that might be essential to a specific policy decision.

In addition to the evaluation of the relevance of specific data, an assessment of the correctness of the data is also a problem which requires input from the humanities as much as (or even more than) from the sciences. It might be questioned as to how persons lacking the necessary technical background and training could be qualified to judge the correctness of the technical information. There are several ways in which they can and must do so. The policy-maker (and his/her humanities advisor) must necessarily utilize some criteria for accepting technical data as "correct." Often this is done by "merely" looking at the

"credentials" of the purported expert and if the credentials appear adequate (again, as measured against some additional unarticulated standard), the data presented by that expert are accepted as correct. But there are certainly other criteria which might be used to judge the acceptability of technical data and the choice among these alternative criteria is one which should be tempered with humanistic wisdom. Indeed, such alternatives are required in situations (which are arising more and more frequently in the policy arena) where there is disagreement among technical experts, all of whom possess the standard credentials. The ultimate judgments that are involved are of persons rather than of data, and these judgments can be made more wisely by individuals with training and skills in the disciplines of the humanities.

Data are also open to external assessment by non-technical experts insofar as observations are dependent on general theoretical assumptions. The case for the theory-dependence of observations has been argued eloquently in recent years by many scholars in philosophy, history and other humanities disciplines. In particular, quantitative data generated by experts in economics, sociology, and the behavioral sciences have been subjected to relatively profound criticisms by humanists who have challenged their validity by identifying serious weaknesses in the theoretical assumptions on which they are based--particularly the concepts of human nature and values central to any such theory. While more difficult to critique by the "outsider," the theoretical assumptions of the biological and physical sciences are also open to such critiques, and humanities scholars should accept this challenge as part of their professional and/or intellectual responsibility. It appears in retrospect that the new "ecological consciousness" in the life sciences resulted from humanistic insights as much or even more than from any radical breakthroughs in the laboratory.

The evaluation of data relates closely to the task of analysis, and in this area the policy-maker also must rely on concepts, methodologies and insights from the humanities. Data from different technical fields can be analyzed using the methods of philosophical logic to identify possible inconsistencies. Fundamental concepts--at both the observational and theoretical levels--can be clarified and refined, and implicit value assumptions can be identified, not so much by means of a specific formalized methodology but through utilization of basic sensitivities and tacit modes of awareness engendered by the disciplined education traditional in the humanities. This kind of analysis is quite foreign to the sciences in their most narrow form of concrete problem solving and theory-confirmation, although it is an essential element of science at the most creative and profound levels.

At this point it is important to digress momentarily to note that I am not attempting to juxtapose the humanities against the sciences. In fact, I reject out of hand Snow's or any other formulation of the "two worlds" thesis. There is at least a spectrum in the intellectual world, with various elements of the humanities disciplines interspersed with elements of the sciences at various points all along it. My present inclinations are towards a much more complex two or even three dimensional model, with the various disciplines relating to and interacting with each other in a variety of ways. Many philosophers, for example, think and write in ways more similar to mathematicians and theoretical

physicists than to literary critics or cultural historians. And the social sciences provide almost limitless obstacles to any attempt to dichotomize the intellectual universe into two polarized camps.

A second and related point that needs to be made here is that in arguing for an expansion of the role of the humanities in the policy process, I am not arguing against the present role of the sciences. Certainly the improvement in technical data from both the natural and social sciences must be credited with having resulted in any improvement in the quality of policy decisions that has occurred in the last several decades. But insofar as the policy process has been dehumanized (or "dehumanitized") during the same period, the gains from the technical side have often been more than offset. In brief, then, what I am arguing is that the role of the humanities should be increased, but not necessarily at the expense of the technical aspects of the policy process.

To return to my main topic, there is one other basic humanities contribution which must still be acknowledged--however briefly. One of the most critical, but most subtle and thus frequently overlooked, elements of the policy-making process is that of perspective. It is a fact that any particular policy issue can be considered from a variety of different perspectives. Insofar as the policy process is generally imbedded in a political system, the more powerful (and/or politically savvy) interested parties usually have their perspectives taken into account. But there are a number of other less influential groups whose point of view is not considered. Even more importantly, there is usually little if any consideration made of broader and more general perspectives--e.g., the general ethical, aesthetic, and historical perspectives on any particular issue. The fact that the perspectives of certain social groups (and individuals) and the general perspectives (of ethics, aesthetics, etc.) are not at present explicitly taken into account in the policy process of course in no way implies that they are not relevant to the decisions being made. Quite the contrary is the case: because these perspectives are relevant, the decision is not being made as wisely as it could and should be.

Once again, the humanities can make significant contributions to the policy process in this regard. The alternatives to political expedience and political/economic power as the bases for policy decisions have been most carefully examined and articulated in the humanities, and the insights gained thereby cry out for serious consideration. Moreover, the general perspectives of ethics, aesthetics, history and "culture" in general have always been the domain of the humanities disciplines. These are areas in which humanities scholars have made important contributions both in terms of detailed analyses and general syntheses--and the substance of their work as well as the concepts and methods used are very relevant to the policy process, however little it is taken into account in actual cases.

I must now proceed on the hope that the above sketch has at least been sufficient to justify as an operating assumption my claim that the humanities are in fact necessarily relevant to the policy process in a variety of ways. The question that still remains concerns what steps if any should be taken by humanities scholars in light of this fact. In answer to this question, I shall only give three examples of some of the

kinds of things which might be done. It is of course up to individual scholars and the appropriate humanities societies to determine what steps will actually be taken.

One of the first, if not the first, steps which should be taken is for scholars in the humanities to devote a greater portion of their research efforts towards elaborating in more detail and depth the relations between their disciplines and the policy process in line with the suggestions which I have made above. Such research could focus on ways in which input (whether tacit or explicit) from the humanities has had an identifiable effect on policy decisions in the past, and on ways in which it could have had impact where the input was not in fact present. (We must of course be quite careful not to indulge in "Monday-morning quarterbacking.") Some studies might also study historical and sociological trends, identifying periods or societies in which the role of the humanities in the policy process has been more and less explicit and significant, and assessing the relative quality of the decisions made in the different contexts. In some cases it might be necessary to take the additional step of "legitimizing" this kind of research insofar as it is not presently recognized as being professionally acceptable, although such research on historical/cultural issues seems to fall clearly in the domain of humanities research and resistance to certifying it as a priority research area would be nothing less than a serious strategic/political error. Certainly a dissertation on the impact of Mill's writings on political philosophy on British foreign policy in the Victorian period or a study of the relevance of literary images of the corporation to federal regulatory policies are legitimate research projects for humanities scholars. And the value--intrinsic and especially ~~extrinsic~~--of such studies is at least as great as the value of the numerous dissertations and journal articles on esoteric non-policy-related topics which are never read or cited by anyone other than the author and referees.

Retrospective studies of actual and possible relations between the humanities and policy processes are of considerable importance on pragmatic grounds in several ways. The carrying out of such research is very much needed insofar as very little has been done previously and thus little academically validated knowledge about this relation is available. Such knowledge is essential for the education of present and future scholars in the humanities, and especially for the education of policy-makers who must be persuaded of the value of humanities input. And this leads to the second--and possibly most distasteful for the traditional "purist"--task, namely the "selling" of the humanities to policy-makers.

The present situation--in which most policy-makers, policy-advisors and "experts" who are called on regularly to provide input to the policy process are persons trained in the disciplines of law, the social sciences (particularly economics), engineering and the natural sciences--is the result of the initiatives of individuals and groups from these disciplines and the default or abdication of responsibility on the part of humanities scholars. To the best of my knowledge, the economists, lawyers and others who currently dominate the policy process have not made any conscious effort to prevent or even discourage input from the humanities. Rather, their primary concern over the last half-century has

been to persuade elected officials and others that they (the social scientists, et. al.) have something to offer, and when given the opportunity they have at least partially delivered on their promises. Certainly now that persons trained in these disciplines constitute the majority of policy-makers, there is little need for them to persuade one another of their own value. It is unfortunately now more difficult to persuade them of the value of input to the policy process from other disciplines--particularly in the humanities. But if humanities scholars are truly concerned about the domination of the policy process by these so-called "technocrats," and if they believe that the humanities disciplines do have something to contribute relevant to policy issues, they have little choice but to prepare, present and press their case as fully and forcefully as they can. (Once again, I want to put myself on record as an advocate of a "let the humanities in" position, but not of a "throw the technocrats out" policy.) The case for the humanities can and should be made directly, with educational projects, submission of unsolicited policy-relevant papers, and other "lobbying" efforts applied at selected points in policy systems--in federal, state and local government as well as in the private sector. Humanities scholars should take every opportunity, and should even take steps to create opportunities, to serve in policy-advisory capacities and especially to serve in policy-making positions in non-academic organizations and to encourage and assist graduating Ph.D.'s to find such positions in lieu of academic careers (which in many cases are no longer available anyway). This strategy of course has the effect of increasing the number and range of employment opportunities for humanities scholars, in addition to contributing to the primary goal of increasing input from the humanities to the policy process.

A third and final example of what can and should be done to achieve this primary goal is in the area of formal education. Many educators, especially in the traditional areas of the humanities, are strongly committed to the principles of general education--in particular to the principle that the humanities should be taught in a relatively general, abstract and isolated manner, and that it should be left to the student to relate the contents of each individual course to the contents of other courses and to concrete "real-life" situations. Such an attitude is mistaken in principle as well as in terms of pragmatics--especially with regard to relating the humanities to the realm of policy. It is mistaken in principle insofar as if the humanities are integrally tied to the policy process (in theory if not in practice), then the failure to explore this relation in humanities courses is to give an incomplete picture of the subject in any given humanities course. It is mistaken on pragmatic grounds in that it is simply unrealistic to expect the typical undergraduate student to relate the contents of a course on Shakespeare, ethical theory, or even 19th century diplomatic history to contemporary policy issues and processes. This judgment is based on my perception that even a significant number of the humanities Ph.D.'s teaching these courses cannot relate them to the policy realm. Making the general student aware of these connections is so important that the humanities community has a responsibility to take every step possible to achieve this end.

It is important when and if humanists begin to implement the above recommendations that they take care to do so in a manner consistent with

the traditions of the humanities. Scholars in philosophy or history or literature or any other discipline who attempt to participate in the policy process will be subjected to a variety of pressures to fit into the role of the "expert" as it has been defined by several generations of economists, lawyers, engineers and others. It will be difficult to avoid being forced into this posture, and even more difficult to develop and establish a distinctive new role and position in the institutional structures. It is also worth mentioning that we should not define our task as that of replacing the "technocrats"; our goal should be that of supplementing and complementing their contributions. It may not be a serious injustice to borrow from Kant in this regard to the effect that "policy judgments without sound technical data are blind, but policy judgments without humanistic perspectives are ignorant."

In closing I must take a moment to draw out what I consider to be the most significant issue implicit in the preceding discussion, a point which might be easily missed by humanists who today find themselves in a highly defensive posture resulting from overproduction of Ph.D.'s, decreasing enrollments in courses and tough competition for research funds from both governmental and private sources. While successful implementation of my recommendations would probably have the effects of enlarging the job market for humanities majors (and Ph.D.'s), increasing enrollments in humanities courses and expanding funding for research in the humanities, I have put forward these recommendations on the basis of much broader and less self-interested principles. The crises in the humanities are really by-products and/or reflections of deeper problems that pervade our society and high-technology cultures in general. The last century has seen a major power shift in the policy realm from the aristocracy to the technocracy, and the new oligarchy has done little if anything to humanize the policy process beyond what it was previously and it may have even become less human (and humane). The increasing reliance on experts who are preoccupied with quantifiable information has been a root cause of the policy decisions that have resulted in the Vietnam War and the degradation of the environment. It is in hopes of improving this process that I am urging that the relation of the humanities to the policy process be strengthened and made more explicit in every possible way. It is towards the end of improving the policy process that my recommendations have been made; without the achievement of this end, any improvement in the job market for humanities Ph.D.'s or any other "benefit" to the humanities would be meaningless.

APPENDIX

Some Concrete but Half-Baked Suggestions for Stimulating Humanities Involvement in the Policy Process

1. Organization of an American Association for the Advancement of the Humanities modeled on the American Association for the Advancement of Science. It should be designed to provide a forum for cross-disciplinary communication (not necessarily interdisciplinary--but this would seem to be an inevitable concomitant) to identify and promote common interests among humanities scholars. This association should sponsor a wide-circulation periodical similar to Science, which would provide an outlet for policy-relevant studies in the humanities. The

annual meeting would hopefully attract national coverage, and policy-makers and other "outsiders" would be invited to participate as lecturers and panelists.

2. Chartering (by Congress) of a National Academy of the Humanities to serve in an advisory capacity similar to that of the National Academies of Science and Engineering. The absence of such an Academy is a blatant indicator of the technocratic biases built into the federal policy-making systems--both legislative and executive.
3. Adding representatives of the humanities disciplines to advisory committees and task forces at both the state and federal level. For example, an Office of Technology Assessment Task Force on methods of measuring the quality of life is presently comprised of engineers, lawyers and social scientists, but has no humanities scholars on either the task force itself or the staff.

COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION RESEARCH AND ITS DEPENDENCE ON BOTH HUMANISTIC AND EMPIRICIST PERSPECTIVES

Thomas D. Cook & Fay Lomax Cook*

One of the more rapidly growing areas within the policy sciences is evaluation research. Most research of this kind is empirical in the sense of being based on observations collected from respondents within a planned survey or experimental design context. The purpose of evaluation research is to provide valid and credible answers about the intended and unintended consequences of social programs. The expectation is that these answers will be made available before a particular decision has to be made, and that the answers will be readily comprehensible to decision makers and to the various constituencies that have an interest in any decisions. A further hope is that, after the conclusions have been communicated, they will be used in any debates about action, not necessarily in such a way that they will determine a decision, but at least in such a way that they become one of several sources of decision-relevant information.

This brief definition of evaluation research stresses its dependence on a survey or experimental design context in which measurements are made. Evaluation research therefore appears to be a domain where the technocrat of design and measurement is king--quite unlike the traditional domain of humanism where the moral philosopher is king even when he or she professes to be only as kingly as the next person. Though it is very difficult to reach an acceptable thumbnail definition of humanism, we shall use the term to refer to concerns with the value implications of human behavior. Stated this way, humanism should be a concern of all persons. Traditionally, however, humanism is most closely associated with studying "the humanities" (as distinct from the social or natural sciences), and with scholarly methods that are based on insight and logical analysis instead of on the systematic measurement of behavior or natural events with some rigorously planned design context.

The purpose of this short (and, alas, all too hastily written) paper is to illustrate how empirical evaluation research can be made more useful by adding humanistic concerns and methods to its present repertoire. But that is not all. We also hope to illustrate how evaluation research can help shed light on humanistic concerns, giving them a new and informative context.

* Although prepared in collaboration with F. L. Cook of Loyola University of Chicago, this paper was presented to the workshop by Thomas Cook, Professor of Psychology at Northwestern University. He took his first degree in comparative literature at Oxford; his Ph.D. is in communications from Stanford. Author with Donald T. Campbell of Sesame Street Revisited, Professor Cook writes on evaluation methodology, particularly in the area of evaluating social programs.

To accomplish these ends we shall refer to two sets of empirical studies. One set relates to the evaluation of "Sesame Street," a well-known educational television program for preschoolers. The goal in discussing "Sesame Street" is to illustrate how impotent current empirical methods are for suggesting action, and to stress how much the action implications of results depend on value considerations. The second example draws on research into the criminal victimization of elderly Americans. The point here will be to suggest how humanists' fears about the breakdown of cherished values can be put into a meaningful context by considering empirical data about circumstances surrounding the victimization of elderly Americans.

These points may seem somewhat obscure at this time. We hope, however, that they will be clarified by the discussion that follows. First, let us turn to "Sesame Street."

The Evaluations of "Sesame Street"

At present, we know three things of importance about "Sesame Street." First, the show is extremely popular with a large number of very different persons. Preschoolers view it regularly in the millions, which was not expected initially because the show is aired on public television and public television does not attract mass audiences. "Sesame Street" also seems to be popular with parents, for they can take advantage of the inadvertent baby-sitting capability of the show, and they can be reassured both by the hope that their child might learn something and also by the fact that he or she is at least not watching the programs of dubious worth that are being aired on commercial stations. Reformers of children's programming are also attracted to the show because it successfully embodies an alternative to current broadcast fare that is stimulating to children and would not cause revenue loss to commercial stations. To reformers, "Sesame Street" proves that alternative programming is already available which is of high quality and will not cost the networks or program sponsors anything at all. Finally, many persons who have to make decisions about preschool education or instructional television are pleased with "Sesame Street" because they think that it demonstrably "works" in the sense that, on the one hand, it alienates few persons, and on the other hand, it appears to cause learning gains. We know, then, that "Sesame Street" is popular with many persons, not necessarily always for the same reasons.

The second thing we know is that in a single six month season "Sesame Street" teaches some letter-related skills and probably also some number-related ones. The problem is that most research to date indicates that the gains are restricted in both size and generality. With respect to size, for instance, the average gain in reciting the alphabet that children from economically disadvantaged homes make in six months is about three letters. Hence, instead of being able to recite the alphabet to L, let us say, they can recite it to P. As regards the generalizability of effects, the most that can be said from past research is that effects are restricted to rote learning about letters and numbers, and there are no indications of reading gains or gains in cognitive skills that require transforming the information that has been learned. For example, though matching forms is a goal of "Sesame Street," the show does not seem to be successful at this in any

noticeable degree. The same is true of being able to classify objects and sort them; and the same is true of learning body parts. Of course, these results hold only for six months of viewing in the USA, and most children view "Sesame Street" for longer. But against this, we have to balance the fact that we now have information about one year's viewing of the Mexican "Sesame Street," and the one year results in Mexico were at least as disappointing as the six month results in the USA. We know that "Sesame Street" can teach some skills; but we have strong suspicions that it does not appreciably increase the average child's knowledge level over the level he would have attained in the course of spontaneous cognitive development without "Sesame Street."

The third thing we think we know about "Sesame Street" is that it is widening achievement gaps. When children enter school at age five the more economically advantaged outperform the less advantaged on a variety of cognitive achievement measures. Such gaps typically increase with age, resulting in a temporal pattern of achievement data which resembles a fan that has been spread out. Since "Sesame Street" is watched more in homes where parental education has been longer and income is higher, children from more advantaged backgrounds tend on the average to gain more from the show than children from less fortunate backgrounds. This widening of the achievement gap should not be over-interpreted since, first, it is of quite small magnitude given the restricted magnitude of the educational effects of the show; and second, because the data on class-related differences in viewing come from the years 1969 to 1971. Nonetheless, the currently available findings do suggest that economically handicapped children may be gaining from "Sesame Street," but they may also be falling further behind their more advantaged contemporaries.

Issues Raised by the Three Findings. We would contend that the findings we have just reviewed about "Sesame Street" are not useful in guiding action unless they are given some perspective in terms of their value implications--implications to which the concerns and methods of humanists would be particularly sensitive. Why is this so?

The example of "Sesame Street" presents us with the problem of deciding whether it is more important to further the interests of a wide range of American preschoolers or the interests of those who currently are not doing so well in the system even though their educational disadvantage is not their own fault. This issue is brought into sharp focus by the fact that helping all children is best achieved by means of a universalistic strategy predicated on broadcasting "Sesame Street" over public airwaves while the goal of helping the less advantaged is best achieved by means of a selective strategy aimed at reaching disadvantaged children in especially large numbers or tailoring the content of the programs so as to meet needs which these children have but advantaged children do not. How can one reasonably decide whether the interests of the many, most of whom are not in obvious educational deprivation and use "Sesame Street" for entertainment, are more important than the interests of the few who have a chronic need to enter school better informed? At present there is no social science data of relevance to this issue, and we doubt whether there will ever be. But a hard decision has to be made by someone, for seeking to optimize the interests of one group must be deleterious to the interests of the other.

The negative correlation of interests would be exacerbated if a decision were made to orient "Sesame Street" more towards the economically disadvantaged. Then the thorny issue arises: Are the interests of disadvantaged children best met by teaching them more--an absolute criterion--or by reducing the gap between their performance and that of their cohorts from more affluent homes--a relative criterion. One could perhaps reasonably reach the absolute criterion by keeping "Sesame Street" on the national airwaves and tailoring its content to meet the special needs of the disadvantaged, for then the disadvantaged might learn more than if the programming were not especially tailored to them, and it would be irrelevant whether gaps widened or not. The main point would be to help economically disadvantaged children make significant educational gains. However, if the educational problem of disadvantaged children were to be defined as a relative one, then it would have to be frankly acknowledged that steps have to be taken to circumvent the forces that currently favor the child from an advantaged home. The main force is that "Sesame Street" is freely available to homes with a set capable of receiving public television signals. To circumvent this the show would have to be made available on a selective basis--to homes or day-care centers specially selected because of the low educational attainment of the preschoolers.

The kind of distribution we have just described would work to the advantage of some children and the detriment of others, and would make for a very different "Sesame Street" from the one we now know. Our point is not to advocate that one action should be taken over another. It is rather to stress that the evaluation findings do not have obvious action implications until one faces the value dilemmas to which the findings themselves give rise. In particular, we have to ponder: First, whose interests should be promoted? Second, should the goal of equalizing group performance be placed above the goal of providing a learning resource which children are free to use as they see fit even though this very freedom to use resources may exacerbate inequalities? Third, is it more important to transmit elementary knowledge to a large number of children at an earlier age than it is to concentrate resources for elementary knowledge transmission on the children who are least likely to acquire the knowledge later? Fourth, if it is decided to concentrate on the less knowledgeable, is it more important to define their problem in terms of absolute or relative "deficits"? Make no mistake; in this domain of educational policy there are no obvious ways of simultaneously reaching both universalistic and selective goals, and the technocrat of evaluation cannot provide answers. At best he can speak only as an informed citizen. However, the humanist recognizes age-old issues on which he has hopefully reflected with the aid of past masters. These issues include: cuius bono; the countervailing relationship between freedom and equality, as some persons define these terms; the issue of whether children are responsible for misfortunes into which they are born and of whether the state has the responsibility to compensate for undeserved misfortunes, etc. The evaluation findings form the background to evaluating; they do not by themselves evaluate. A value (in the sense of a judgment) is placed on the findings by relating them to social values that will be promoted or jeopardized by the policies whose effects were empirically studied.

The rash empiricist might interject at this point: "I could measure the relative utility of having many children of all backgrounds know more sooner versus having just the disadvantaged know more sooner; and I could also measure the relative utility of the disadvantaged having greater absolute knowledge versus closing the achievement gap which currently separates their achievement from that of others. The empiricist would then discuss a variety of survey and scaling procedures for gaining information about the utilities different kinds of persons assign to different goals. The problem with these procedures is that they tap preferences rather than judgments made at a high level of consciousness after a sober and prolonged consideration of the pros and cons of the different viewpoints. For instance, we believe that the parents of economically disadvantaged children might well prefer to have their children know more as opposed to seeing gaps closed. It is not at all clear to us, however, that they would continue to have the same preferences after the implications of each position were explained to them by persons with different philosophical positions on the issues. In any event, we are skeptical that much light can be thrown by empiricists on the tough value questions that are raised by their work. The work of empiricists results in findings; the evaluation of these findings demands value choices to which the findings themselves speak only indirectly at best.

Criminal Victimization of the Elderly

Five conclusions can reasonably be drawn at present about the criminal victimization of elderly Americans. First, as we have documented elsewhere (Cook & Cook, 1976; Antunes, Cook, Cook, & Skogan, 1977), there is great public concern about how elderly persons are victimized--a concern expressed by politicians, social scientists, representatives of elderly groups, and the elderly themselves. This concern is publicly very visible, being the subject of many stories on local and national radio and television, and appearing in newspapers. The origins of the concern lie in the general apprehension about increases in crime, and in the special implications of younger persons committing crimes against elderly people who are especially vulnerable and should anyway be treated with a special respect that befits their age. Indeed, much of the commentary about criminal victimization of the elderly is couched in terms of a breakdown of values, and it is our impression that some reflective laymen consider victimization of the elderly as one symbol of a larger deterioration in the quality of social life.

Second, we know that elderly Americans are not victimized more than younger Americans in any crime category that has been studied to date. Indeed, they are victimized less often in every category except for personal larceny. But even here, purse-snatchings and wallet heists are no more frequent with the elderly than the young. In short, the elderly are less likely than others to be victims of crime. Of course, we cannot attribute this to criminals deliberately avoiding the elderly, for we do not know yet whether the elderly--who stay home more than others--would still continue to be infrequent victims if a statistical control were instituted for the smaller amount of time that the elderly are on the streets.

Third, we know that when the elderly are victimized they do not suffer physical or financial consequences that are worse than for younger persons, even when cognizance is taken of the fact that most elderly persons have less money to lose. Concern about criminal victimization of the elderly would not be realistic, therefore, if it were based on the special physical or financial hardship that crime visits on the elderly.

Fourth, we know that the elderly fear crime more than others, even though they are victimized less and do not suffer more. Moreover, this is a generalized fear, felt both by day and at night, by men and by women, by blacks and by whites.

Finally, we know that the pattern of crimes against the elderly is different from the pattern against younger persons. This is because most of the crimes committed against the elderly are economically motivated, while for younger persons they are violence-motivated. Elderly people also are likely to be victimized by criminally inexperienced black youths acting alone and without weapons who operate in or near the victims' homes and who do not know their victims. Other adults, with the exception of adolescents, are likely to be victimized by the criminally more experienced who are older, act in gangs, use weapons, and do not necessarily operate near the victim's home. Thus, elderly Americans, if victimized, are likely to fall prey to beginners whom they have never seen before and who are on the lookout for opportunistic targets whose purses they can snatch. The consequence of this may be that elderly Americans come to fear young strangers, particularly black ones, and do not feel secure even in or near the sanctuary of their homes.

The Issues Raised by the Criminal Victimization of Elderly Americans. Many of the concerns raised by commentators on the criminal victimization of the elderly can loosely be labeled as "humanistic" concerns. That is, they are directed towards the social value implications of young persons attacking relatively defenseless older targets to whom the young should anyway owe respect. Yet the currently available data suggest that this concern can be considered misplaced insofar as the elderly are infrequent victims of crime and the crimes that afflict them are among the least dangerous and so do not have especially serious physical or financial consequences when they are perpetrated against the elderly. Unlike the case with "Sesame Street," where the findings led to the value concerns, it is the case with criminal victimization of the elderly that the value concerns are illuminated retrospectively by the data, and the value concerns prove to be less problematic than first thought. In other words, the data serve to edit the humanistic concerns by putting them into a context which allows us to judge the relative severity of the criminal victimization of elderly Americans. Where once the findings needed the humanist's perspective, here the humanist's concerns need the perspective of the findings.

Two objections might be raised at this point. The first would be to note that elderly Americans express greater fear of crime and that this merits labeling as a problem. We agree with this; however, it should be borne in mind that the problem with the victimization of elderly Americans is the problem of their fear and not of their victimization. The implications of this are considerable, both with respect

to policies for alleviating the problem and also with respect to narrowing the definition of the problem and hence putting the magnitude of the real problem into a more realistic perspective.

The second objection would be to the relative criterion we have adopted for concluding that there is little problem per se in crimes against the elderly. Why, it might be argued, does one have to compare features of crimes against the elderly with features of crimes against younger persons? Why not simply note that there are indeed some crimes against the elderly and that the number of these is increasing every year even though at no faster rate than for crimes against younger persons? The absolute numbers of crimes against the elderly are surely enough to make one question whether some of the values buttressing our social life are being undermined. Our answer to this objection is simple. Evolutionary epistemologists tell us that we cannot know anything except by reference to some standard. Hence, by looking at the absolute level of crimes against the elderly, our hypothetical objector is really using a relative standard since the obtained crime level is probably being compared to no crime at all. We believe the "no-crime" baseline to be unrealistic, and can think of no better baseline for inferring the seriousness of crimes against the elderly than by comparing them with crimes against other persons.

Conclusions

The position we have argued in this paper is very simple. In order to be able to evaluate the consequences of a program--like "Sesame Street"--or the validity of claims about factors symbolizing the breakdown of basic social values--like crimes against the elderly--we need both data collected within a systematic survey or design framework and also a sensitivity to value concerns. This sensitivity should help give a perspective to empirical findings (as with "Sesame Street") and should also suggest which empirical findings are worth generating (as with criminal victimization of the elderly). In our view it is myopic to consider problems with the intellectual straitjacket of "Polaritätsdenken"--of putting empiricism into competition with humanism. They are complementary; not only in the simple sense that the empiricist's values necessarily intrude into his work even while he and the public system of science try to keep them out; not only in the simple sense that the empiricist's findings are part of the materials that stimulate and inform the cogitations of humanists; but also they are complementary in the sense that one cannot comprehensively evaluate any significant problem of social life without each viewpoint and method.

But beware. Though the perspectives of both the empiricist and the humanist might be necessary for gaining a comprehensive understanding of social problems so as to guide policy decisions, they will rarely be sufficient for guiding policy. Concerns of politics, personality, and luck have to be added to concerns of science and values. Together the five enter the cauldron from whose inchoate seethings emerge the magic-touched decisions of the policy world.

WORKING PAPERS BY PARTICIPANTS FROM
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

These short papers were prepared by GW faculty and administrators strictly for the purposes of the workshop. Anyone who wishes further information on or continued discussion of the matters described may contact the respective authors in care of the Division of Experimental Programs. The papers are reproduced here in three groupings. Those in the first set describe particular degree programs; the second group consists of reports on specific courses in the policy field; the third set is made up of personal statements by faculty who have been involved in this academic area.

I

THE MASTER OF ARTS IN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY

Margaret E. Boeckmann*

The Master's Program in Sociology and Social Policy at the George Washington University is in its first operational year. Consequently, the program is still in an emergent state. The first cohort of students is currently involved in the curriculum specifically developed to achieve the two major goals of the program: 1) to give the student a sociological perspective on the processes of social policy formulation and implementation; and 2) to train social planners and social policy analysts. At this stage in the development of the program, we are monitoring closely both the courses and the students in the program in an attempt to evaluate, formatively, our potential to achieve these two goals.

The rationale behind the program, eloquently articulated in the document proposing it, is based on a conviction that the discipline of sociology has something unique and important to offer policy studies.¹ Consequently, the sociological perspective is the touchstone of the program and a key element in its curriculum. The students are required to take the two standard graduate level social theory courses as well as a new seminar in sociology and social policy. It is in these courses that the student is exposed to classical and modern sociological thinking as

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¹Lengermann, Patricia, "Sociology and Social Policy: A Proposal for a New Substantive Field in the Masters of Arts Program in Sociology," September 16, 1975.

well as the growing body of social science literature concerned with the processes of social policy formulation and implementation.

The second major goal of the program is reflected in the emphasis on quantitative methods. Since research skills are considered crucial to the role of the social planner, students in the program are required to take six graduate credits in research methods and are strongly advised to offer statistics as a tool. In addition, a degree of interdisciplinary exposure is considered important for the role of social planner. The M.A. student electing sociology and social policy as an area of concentration must take at least six hours of electives in other departments. Of course, a rationale must be offered for the particular department and courses selected. Finally, since it is assumed that the student will have a particular substantive policy focus, he/she is required to participate in a graduate seminar oriented toward that particular policy area, as well as to select electives which will enhance familiarity with the problems specific to the area of interest.

It is in the courses designed to impart the sociological perspective that the humanistic tradition in sociology will be a major emphasis. The student will be sensitized to the humanist's concern for the role of values and ideology in the policy process, as well as his insistence on the importance of process, change, and description in understanding social problems, in contrast to the positivistic approach to knowing.

This program recognizes the importance of sensitizing the budding social planner and policy analyst to the centrality in policy formation of the value dimension inherent in questions of equality, liberty, cooperation and public interest. In this respect, the program reflects the belief that knowledge of the importance of values and of "empirical work done in terms of it in American society, can help planners to understand and anticipate problems they may encounter in their efforts to persuade sectors of the society to cooperate with particular policy efforts." In large part it is recognition of the fact that values have an important role in the policy process, as well as a perception that most policy analysts and planners do not explicitly incorporate this fact into their work, that has led the sociology department to consider training policy planners and analysts. It is a hope that these planners and analysts trained in sociology will be able to make the question of value itself a decisional issue in the policy process.

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE UTILITY OF HUMANISTS

Roderick S. French*

Behind the difficulties most of us experience in our efforts to articulate a place for the humanities in policy studies lies the more

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fundamental problem of conceptualizing a role for humanists in public life. Even those who are convinced that humanists have a positive contribution to make often express themselves in terms which reflect the discontinuities of modern society which they are motivated to overcome.

Assuming that it will be taken in the spirit of academic disputation with the sponsor of our workshop, I may be permitted to illustrate this last point by citing a statement from one of the annual NEH reports to Congress. The defense of the Endowment's public programs (as contrasted with support of teaching and research) was based on a distinction between two kinds of humanistic knowledge. "One is public and social, the other private and individual. One strives for the understanding and resolution of historical circumstances. The other respects the work of the mind precisely because that embodies our highest powers, because intelligence is a legitimate end in itself."¹

I am convinced that to speak in those terms is to risk giving away the game before it is played. To do so is to accept the alienation of the academic humanities which has become steadily more severe since the scientific and bourgeois revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries. If one capitulates to this state of affairs, then the primary meaning of the humanities is that of private consolation for the daily subjugation of our finer sensibilities to the "tyranny of the objective mind" and to the commercial spirit. The public role of humanities seen from this dispirited perspective is either one of adventitious influence exercised through individual humanists who happen to hold positions of authority or one of "improving" entertainments staged for the masses. I would argue that if there cannot be a definition of the role of the humanities which unites their private and public meanings, then neither side of a bifurcated humanistic tradition will prove efficacious.

The reference to efficacy leads me to recall some comments on our topic attributed to Aaron Wildavsky, dean of the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of California in Berkeley. Dean Wildavsky said that schools of public policy should choose as faculty "economists interested in politics, political scientists interested in economics, and sociologists, lawyers, historians, philosophers, etc. interested in both."² He went on in the same context to describe policy analysis as "an art involving moral choices and a balance between being right and being effective." The concern for this balance could be a step toward humanistic policy studies, but as stated it appears to be a merely mechanical notion of trade-offs between unrelated factors. Dean Wildavsky's proposal also betrays a certain loss of the original confidence in analytical reason which gave rise to the social sciences.

We have come a long and troubling way since John Locke voiced the expectation that morality might become one of "the sciences capable of demonstration; wherein I doubt not but from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences as incontestible as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong might be made out."³ After three centuries spent in pursuit of that vision of what might be achieved through the scientific study of human experience, many humanists would like to reconsider the assumptions of the whole enterprise and join Maurice Natanson in asking: "Is it possible to be true to both life and science?"⁴

There is not space here to elaborate the affirmative, unified view of human experience which is to be found in classic American Pragmatism. The Pragmatists were as concerned about rigorous analysis as was Mr. Locke, but they did not take geometry as the paradigm for scientific reasoning about human affairs. John Dewey & Co. saw the task of philosophical intelligence to be that of the continuous analysis of issues raised in the on-going experience of the species--both so-called subjective and social experience. The putative conflict between practical issues and conceptual issues was overcome through the redefinition of intelligence as effective intervention in the social and physical processes of life. The Pragmatists demanded an integration of "beliefs about the world" and "beliefs about values and purposes." They sought a middle path between dogmatic moralism with its appeals to abstract principles and the escape from judgment through the quantification of all data.

As it happened, GW's philosophy department maintained its basic orientation in this tradition whereas the departments in most other American universities in the mid-twentieth century came under the overwhelming influence of either more quantitative or more subjective approaches to philosophy. It was therefore an act of continuity with this past when the department responded to a growing demand that policy questions be addressed from a humanistic perspective by establishing a master's degree in philosophy and social policy. It was also to be expected that the curriculum would be interdisciplinary. (Candidates are required to take from one-half to two-thirds of their course work in other fields. The department also hopes that its core courses will be recognized as having value for students in the various other policy studies degree programs in the university. Syllabi for the four core seminars are available on request.)

Interdisciplinarity is a mandatory feature of sound humanistic education. For one thing, it is the only check on the delusion of universality which is a standing temptation in all disciplines--perhaps especially when they are in a creative phase and/or in the minds of the their most able representatives. Genius is a poor model for the training of the more moderately endowed leaders of a bureaucratized, technological society. The habits of intellectual modesty and analytical collaboration must be developed in the universities; the structures of public life reinforce patterns of isolation and specialization.

The beginning of an answer to our opening question is contained in the last point. One who receives a humanistic education, whatever his dominant or primary discipline, is a valuable person in public life precisely because he/she is able to function as a generalist. Such persons are a requirement for the governance of contemporary societies on both ideological and function grounds. A pluralistic society which is democratic in its goals and over-specialized in its work roles requires policy makers and administrators who are capable of reconciling different categories of criteria, of appreciating deep cultural differences, and of seeing present decisions in historical perspective. Humanists, perhaps to their own greatest surprise, can be not only decorative but useful in the late 20th century.

¹NEH, "Humanities," December 1972.

²Chronicle of Higher Education, July 26, 1976.

³An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Chapter 3.

⁴Philosophy of the Social Sciences, p. 187.

THE PH.D. AND POLICY STUDIES: ONE EXPERIENCE

Clarence C. Mondale*

This account of our Ph.D. in Education Policy is historical in nature. It describes a deliberate effort to "bend" the requirements of the Ph.D. degree in order to accommodate the requirements of appropriate field-based and agency-based policy study. The story should be instructive to anyone thinking of offering a graduate program in policy studies. The effort brought to light a whole range of characteristic biases and boundaries. We did develop a plan for a degree and did get that plan adopted by our Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. The plan only partly achieved the accommodation we had in mind and has not yet had a real trial.

The effort began in early 1972. A newly formed unit of the university had been empowered to undertake curriculum development on an institution-wide scale. Such development was to be related to emerging institutional academic priorities. It has long been said that if GW is to achieve national distinction, it will be because it has developed academic programs appropriate to its Washington location. Our curricula in arts and sciences were not very different from curricula at institutions in very different locations. Clearly much of the talent resident in or occasional to Washington is concerned with the formulation of public policy. Washington policy-makers have come to rely on short-term commissions and occasional consultation for advice often more properly the outgrowth of long-term and continuing study. It seemed to us that there was an increasing overlap between work done in research and development at federal agencies and policy-related study at this and other universities. It ought to be possible, we thought, to develop academic programs that combined teaching, research, professional training and policy study. For all of the above reasons, we thought it a good idea to see what could be done to develop programs of graduate study of public policy at this university.

Associated with the university is an Institute for Educational Leadership, an organization which arranges for interchange between scholars concerned with education policy and officials in federal and state agencies. IEL represented an invaluable resource for bridging the gap between the university and the "field," and so we began to think of a

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degree in education policy. With some hesitancy, officials at IEL said they would be willing to join in discussions.

As at other universities, there is a substantial gulf at GW between our professional schools and our departments in arts and sciences. We felt that degree programs in policy studies, to be credible, should involve our professional schools. If we were to study education policy, the School of Education should be involved. With some hesitancy, the dean and faculty of that school said they would join us in discussions.

The other principal party to the discussions came from the faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (GSAS). That group shared an interest in policy studies as an area of research. They felt that a program in education policy studies might supply a means to concentrate otherwise scattered interests among a number of departments. Most of them came from the social sciences. It was assumed from the outset that the new program would be housed in GSAS.

In June 1972 GW's President Elliott called together the principal parties and gave his blessing to the enterprise. In a series of summer meetings, we attempted to discover means by which mutual involvement among the interested groups might strengthen them all. We agreed that we would make an attempt to integrate professional and scholarly concerns, so that a graduate of the program could go on to either academic research or public agencies. We tried to discover areas of study that reflected our several strengths.

In retrospect, differences among the principal parties were more decisive than their similarities. The Institute conducted a poll of its constituency among Washington agencies. That constituency said that it was interested only if the new degree program included acceptance of certain unconventional kinds of learning. Would there be means for validating experiential learning? Would there be internships? Could the language requirements be waived? Would dissertations be acceptable that were done as part of the work of a given agency, in which authorship was often shared? Would seasoned veterans in the field participate in something like an equal way with GW faculty in the teaching of courses and on dissertation committees?

The School of Education was caught betwixt and between. Representatives of the school were not confident that a structure could be devised that would be housed in GSAS and yet give their interests due respect. For example, if a steering committee were appointed, who would appoint representatives from the School of Education? The fact that the degree was in education policy would represent a concession that a degree in education could be offered by another school. What was to be the balance between the claims of professional training and the claims of training in research?

GSAS faculty members were skeptical of the whole idea of non-traditional study. Individuals in high administrative positions often enrolled for GW graduate programs, they argued, and almost as often proved themselves to be academically incompetent. That being the case, where does one draw the line between learning on the job and learning for credit? Why emphasize internships if it could not be demonstrated

that students learned more through them than in the classroom? An IEL representative suggested that the degree program be restricted to individuals who had had field experience. That suggestion was rejected by GSAS faculty members as a matter of principle. The idea of policy studies is amorphous and therefore suspect, said the GSAS representatives. They therefore insisted that the proposal incorporate the requirement that candidates demonstrate competency within an established academic discipline as well as in policy studies. We had first talked of an M.A. as well as a Ph.D. program. It was decided to begin with a Ph.D. program, and see how that went. GSAS representatives insisted that any Ph.D. program, by definition, centered upon research. Since our School of Education is oriented toward professional training rather than research, the question as to their contribution to the program reduced down to the issue as to who among their faculty was doing relevant research.

In July 1973 a proposal was submitted to the dean of GSAS. The new degree program was to include four fields of study, one of which was to be related to professional education, and one of which was to concentrate upon public policy. All students were to achieve proficiency in either statistics or computer programming and in appropriate rhetorical skills. The dissertation was to demonstrate appropriate research competencies as applied to a significant issue in education policy. Individuals from the "field" were to participate in the planning of the program, in the teaching of courses and as members of dissertation committees. A long paragraph in the proposal pledged that an effort would be made to develop tests or test-equivalents as a means of giving credit for extra-academic learning. The program was to begin in 1974-75 with no more than ten candidates admitted, so that a test period could precede any longer-term commitments.

The proposal was adopted by the GSAS faculty in Fall 1973, and is now in place. It has drawn a small number of good students. It has suffered severely because of the fact that there has been no full-time director able to canvass the field for interested candidates and galvanize support throughout the university. It has had no full-time director because the university was unwilling to authorize a new faculty position with tenure privileges as an add-on to present faculty, and because the departments have been unwilling to "displace" some of their standing faculty commitments to accommodate a new emphasis upon education policy.

A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY EDUCATION

Albert H. Teich*

The main objectives of the Graduate Program in Science, Technology, and Public Policy are first to educate students to play an active role

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in the policy-making process relating to scientific and technological issues and second to provide a base for research and other activities which complement and enhance the educational program. Although some of the Ph.D. students affiliated with the program have pursued or are likely to pursue academic careers, the program is largely professional in orientation. Most of our graduates have taken jobs in agencies of the executive branch of the federal government, Congressional staffs, international organizations, or firms specializing in policy analysis under government contract. The kinds of policy issues with which the program deals are focused mainly on the national or international level and fall into two general categories: (1) those involving cultivation of scientific and technological resources and their application to the solution of societal problems (e.g., allocation of resources among competing R&D priorities; management of scientific institutions), and (2) those involving questions of broader public policy concern in which science and technology play a major role (energy policy; technology transfer to developing nations; use of technical information in regulatory decision-making).

Four basic themes underlie the program's educational aims. First, we seek to familiarize students with the substantive content of the science policy field--the issues, actors, and institutions of current importance to the field, as well as some historical perspectives on its development. Second, we attempt to expose students to the theoretical insights and methodological tools of relevant disciplines to aid them in thinking systematically and analytically about science policy issues. Political science is the discipline most central to our approach, but economics, public and business administration, sociology, and computer sciences are also important. Third, we aim to imbue students with a sensitivity to the moral and ethical questions involved in science and technology policy issues. This is not a simple matter, for the value conflicts inherent in such contemporary problems as the conduct of recombinant DNA research are difficult enough to understand, much less resolve. Finally, in a broad and basic sense, we try to develop in our students a certain type of mind-set--a willingness to face issues in a real-world environment and to take responsibility for the consequences of their actions. This last is not something that can be taught directly, of course. We seek to achieve it by involving students in policy-related research and, where possible, in actual policy-making roles.

The program is shaped in many ways by GWU's downtown Washington location. It gives us unparalleled access to persons, organizations, and events in the science and technology policy sphere, as well as a sense of immediacy and involvement in the mainstream of activities. It aids in recruiting a heterogeneous student population and in placing our students after they complete their programs. Sometimes, however, it may be a liability for us, particularly in the sense that it limits our ability to step back from the fray and reflect upon larger questions with a certain detachment.

This is the risk of intimate involvement in policy studies, and this is one realm in which we would stand to benefit from collaboration with academic colleagues in the humanities. We express our anxieties from time to time about the inability of mankind to control the pace and

direction of technological change, but we spend most of our time at the nitty-gritty level of policy-making, worrying about such things as this year's federal R&D budget. Can philosophers, historians, and other humanists find a vehicle with which to aid us in maintaining an appropriate critical distance from the substance of our policy concerns? The challenge is not a new one, but neither is it one that has been satisfactorily answered. I, for one, feel the need most strongly.

II

AN UNDERGRADUATE COURSE ON LIBERAL EDUCATION POLICY

Marshall W. Davies*

In Spring 1975, the Division of Experimental Programs offered a course called "The Learning of Values and the Value of Learning: Liberal Education and the Contemporary University." This was the third in a series of policy oriented conference courses offered under the general title of "Experimental Humanities 198: Conference on Policy Studies and the Humanities." The course attempted to engage GW students and faculty in a deliberate consideration of liberal education policy issues, particularly as those issues related to GW.

The development of the course was perhaps as important as its execution, for it offered an opportunity for many persons to organize and express their ideas about liberal education. In late summer 1975, a statement outlining the intent of the course was distributed to seventy faculty members. Most of them responded with written statements, and many of those faculty respondents were later interviewed. This became a means for collecting a cross section of faculty views on the meaning of a liberal education as well as a means for planning the course. Many of the faculty members interviewed later participated in class sessions. A similar approach was followed with students and resulted in a student-oriented announcement of the course.

The course design called for limited enrollment of upper division undergraduates for three or six credits. On Tuesdays the whole class met to examine general issues of liberal education. GW faculty members and administrators delivered lectures and participated in discussions. Care was taken to schedule persons representing a variety of disciplines and philosophies of education. On Thursdays the class broke into three small groups according to student interest. Students sorted themselves into those groups by their interest in: 1) traditional and classical forms of liberal education; 2) experimental forms of liberal education; and 3) the student community and its relationship to liberal education. Again, many GW faculty members and administrators participated in the small group discussions.

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Each student was required to "contract" with his/her section coordinator for a semester project which was to combine study of institutions elsewhere or in other times with an examination of practice at GW. Each student was also required to submit an essay on one of three general topics. The essay was intended as a reflection upon and an evaluation of issues raised by the course. The students' reading list was extensive. At the conclusion of the course, the students held a workshop, at which a statement was developed making seventeen recommendations for changes at GW. Two weeks later, a faculty workshop reviewed the same kind of issues that had been discussed in the course.

An extensive evaluation of the course was conducted, and it was concluded that the course did have a noticeable effect on the students. Specifically, the course (1) provided the students with new information about higher education; and (2) caused them to reconsider many prior attitudes toward higher education.

In terms of impact on students, the most obvious characteristic of the course was that the students had highly differentiated experiences. The individualized nature of the impact appeared to be largely a function of the "baggage" that each student brought with him/her. Each individual's successes, failures, hopes and anxieties as they related to education became important--(albeit often private)--input into this class. The subject of the course was at once both theoretical and "real," which prevented most students from having an entirely impartial, academic attitude. Thus, each student's own experiences with his/her own education became a major determiner of just how the course would affect that particular student.

The course had many internal problems and was criticized to a surprising extent by all of the students who were interviewed during the evaluation. However, all of those students made it clear that their criticisms were intended to be constructive. All felt that the course should be repeated, and all claimed that they would recommend it to other students.

One of the problems encountered was that the highly differentiated impact of the course on the students was both a strength (meet the student where he is, respond to the student's individual needs, etc.) and a weakness (grading criteria, course structure, etc.). Another problem was the unfulfilled expectations of some students who thought that they were going to affect the university in some way by participating in the class. In addition, there were numerous specific student complaints and criticisms. But, because of the individualized nature of the students' experiences, their criticisms of particular components of the course tended to offset each other. One student's "best" lecturer was another student's "worst."

However, none of these "problems" had much to do with the impact of the course on the students. In the words of one of the course coordinators: "I'm sure on reoffering we would do a neater job. I'm not sure we would do a better job." The course was hard work for both faculty and students and was not as tightly organized as some would have liked, but the final judgement was that it was very successful.

PHILOSOPHIES OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: FRAMES OF REFERENCE, METHODOLOGIES, ISSUES

T. Z. Lavine*

The dominating social scientific interest of the 1970's in policy studies was the motivation in large part for the development in 1974 of an interdisciplinary master's degree program in Philosophy and Social Policy by the Department of Philosophy at George Washington University. Some members of the Department of Philosophy perceived that philosophers might play a role in the policy area by offering historical, methodological, epistemological, normative, and integrative contributions to the variety of problems entailed in public policy.

Of the core of four required courses offered by the Department of Philosophy in the Philosophy and Social Policy master's program, only the basic course, Philosophy of the Social Sciences will be discussed here.

The use of social scientific knowledge in policy research and in policy design calls for a grasp of the meaning of what we claim to know ("What do you mean?") and what are the grounds for our claims ("How do you know?"). The principal contribution of this course is the mind-expanding overview it seeks to provide with respect to the kinds and numbers of methodologies available and operative on the contemporary scene, and their divergent and controversial logics of social scientific procedure. The methodologies which are brought into focus are: (1) Neopositivism (Objectivism, Naturalism, Empiricism, Behaviorism) (Hempel, Popper, Nagel); (2) Interpretive Understanding (Verstehen) (Weber, Becker, etc.); (3) Phenomenology and Existential Sociology and Psychology (Schutz, Berger and Luckmann, Tiryakian); (4) Ethno-methodology (Garfinkel); (5) Functionalism; Methodological Holism vs. Methodological Individualism (Merton, Watkins, Lukes); (6) Systems Theory; (7) Action Theory (Davidson, Winch); (8) Sociology of Knowledge and Critical Theory (Mannheim, Habermas). Each of these methodologies will be seen in relation to the issues involved in its historical emergence, and all will be perceived to be influenced by and reactive to the rise and power by the 17th century of the methodology of the physical sciences. Some of the critical problems which cut across all of these methodologies, and some specific topics, are: the unity of method argument; the competing theories of explanation; the context of discovery vs. context of validation argument; the distinctions between action and behavior, motivation and cause; instrumental rationality and substantive rationality; the problem of objectivity, fact and value; ideology and problem of interests.

Each methodology is assessed as to its benefits and costs, with respect to its cognitive, humanistic and policy-related implications. These considerations are brought to bear, finally, upon a specific policy research project, Christopher Jencks, et al., Inequality: A

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Re-Assessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America, Harper, 1973. Here, questions with respect to social policy arise. What kind of intervention into the social process is made by the adopted social policy? How can the gap between "value-free" social science and value-directed social policy be negotiated? What justifies the promotion or protection by policy of the interests of specific social groups? What long-range effects of policy are predictable? for the interests promoted? for other interest groups? What is the relation between social policy and a totalistic social planning? (The Jencks study takes the step from policy to total social planning).

The enthusiasm with which the social sciences have promoted the growth of policy research in the decade of the 1970's may turn out to be encountering problems by the decade's end. The proliferation of policy research may be seen to be moving toward what Jurgen Habermas has called a "crisis of legitimation" in which the neglected issues of justification or legitimation of many discrete policy endeavors, their outcomes, and relationships come home finally to roost.

THE LEGAL PROCESS

Gregory H. Williams*

A new undergraduate experimental humanities course on the role of law in society has been offered for the past three years. The purpose of the course was to provide undergraduate students with a general knowledge of the operation of the American legal system and the basic societal assumptions and values that mold that system. Substantive but not extremely technical areas of law were investigated through lectures and student projects. Focus was on the humanities and social sciences to exhibit their effect on the development of the law. In short, our goal was to observe how policy development of the law affects and is affected by social behavior, custom, public opinion, economic and cultural values.

Our approach was to investigate two major areas of the law each semester. For example, one of the areas that we selected focused on the way in which law imposes itself on what normally or traditionally has been called the private sector. We looked at the problems surrounding automobile accident litigation. Our strategy was to assess the history of the courts in ordering private relationships; how fault has been placed, and the factors that have affected the development of remedies for private injury. An analysis of the importance of precedent, logical consistency, custom and social welfare in their impact on the formulation of judicial decisions showed students that the judicial method is less antiseptic and preordained than originally believed. A more direct focus on the judicial policy making process was illustrated by focusing on the inadequacies of the legal system in attempting to adjust to "new technology." For example, the resultant litigation arising from the

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misuse of automobiles required the development of new theories and rules concerning the placing of fault and the awarding of damages. Finally these and other problems of court load and equity of awards precipitated legislative and executive action to develop no-fault automobile insurance.

An understanding of the fact that the courts cannot always satisfactorily resolve a crisis and knowledge of the fact that other means of resolution must be sought is clearly involved in the study of the advent of no-fault insurance. An inquiry into how and why the states are acting certainly raises questions of what factors influence the development of public policy and the nature of the concern of law with social equity and justice.

This same approach of choosing a basic subject area and using it as a springboard was undertaken the second half of the semester. We concentrated on an area of the criminal law: the regulation of the use of drugs. We examined the historical development of drug laws with particular emphasis on the impact of cultural values and public opinion.

The basic thrust of the course was to combine a social science and humanistic orientation to evaluate legal policy making. The attempts to draw from history, philosophy, political science, economics, and sociology were a critical feature of the course.

The course was not a pre-law course; the subject matter previously mentioned is certainly beyond the scope of what is taught in a traditional pre-law course. Obviously the course dealt with an analysis of the institutional nature of law and government, but it avoided any pretense of law school education. Substantive areas of the law were investigated, but the course was aimed more at the creation of citizens informed about the general process of legal policy making. In conclusion, then, the course presented an overview of how our legal policy develops, how it changes, and how it responds to social, economic and political problems.

Particular problems of student enrollment, faculty interest and curriculum development have been previously detailed. (See materials in the report of the workshop on Administrative Strategies for Curriculum Change.) Nonetheless, it is our opinion that the structure of the course is sound and valuable in providing undergraduate students with an exposure to the diverse influences upon the development of the law.

III

TOWARD HUMANE POLICY STUDIES

Bayard L. Catron*

We are principally concerned with how to make public policy (and indeed private policy!) more responsive to human values, aspirations, concerns--however diverse and conflicting those might be within a given

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human group. More particularly, we are interested in policy studies, and how a humanistic orientation might enlighten and enliven them. I believe that it can be shown that the usual application of the techniques of economics, for example, to social policy issues tends to favor the young as against the old, the white and male as against the non-white and the female.¹ The first issue, therefore, is whether there is, or can be constructed, a humanistic methodology for policy studies.

I would not like to see this workshop fix on the question: "How can we crank humanism into public policy?" This question, substituting "social science" for "humanism," has been addressed ad nauseam in the literature. The burgeoning literature--written largely of course by social scientists, and not by policy actors--has been self-searching in many respects. But it has also too often been self-serving on the one hand, and irrelevant to the policy process on the other. I am sympathetic to the plight of the policy-oriented social scientist who, often from "humanistic" motives, bears the opprobrium of his "pure science" colleagues in order to do policy research only to find himself shunned, manipulated, castigated, coopted, or scapegoated by policy actors. I would hate to see perfectly respectable historians, philosophers and others run headlong into such a grinder without fair warning.

I believe we should be cautious as we approach the issue of curriculum development. Academic "refitting" programs run at least two sorts of risk--they sometimes create unrealistic expectations, which train people for failure; and they often assume that the translation of capabilities and perceptions of a given sort into useful skills in another domain is a simple matter of training, which may lead to the development of successful but unhappy graduates. The "retraining" approach worked only moderately well with aerospace engineers thrown out of work by shifting federal priorities, as they applied their skills to "urban engineering." Such a strategy should be expected to work rather less well with those not accustomed to think of themselves as social interventionists or "engineers" of any kind.²

There is no question that public policy in this country has suffered from the lack of historical sensitivity, and from inadequate attention to philosophical underpinnings. More boldly, I would argue that this is the major shortcoming of our policy process. But it is a

¹ The point applies equally to many political studies, which tend to take the existing distribution of wealth and power for granted, and attempt to account for differential outcomes of the policy process on the basis of interest group politics.

² The GW program in "Philosophy and Social Policy" provides a setting for those with various backgrounds to explore their own interests, career expectations, and talents within an interdisciplinary program which promotes cross-departmental involvement. The GW Masters of Public Administration degree program admits students from any disciplinary background, on the theory that there is no particular undergraduate concentration that is uniquely or inherently preferable in preparing one for a public service career.

considerable and unwarranted inference from this that we should give historians and philosophers prominent roles in the government or appoint them consultant savants. Neither is it a necessary conclusion that we should train historians and philosophers to be policy analysts or actors.

I do not believe that we need new specialties such as "policy historian," or "philosoph-analyst." We do clearly need a strengthening of liberal education at the undergraduate level, and a systematic defense of the generalist, to counter the tendency toward specialization. Given the credential orientation of our society, we also need outlets at the graduate level (and also "career ladders") for those who want to utilize liberal education and a humanistic orientation in a "public service" career.³ For at least the last decade, some significant fraction of students applying to law schools have not been doing so out of a love for the law, or even with any intention of practicing law, but rather as a way of channeling their humanistic concerns into a socially productive and personally rewarding direction. We should recognize the humanistic contributions of such groups.

THE HUMANIST AND PUBLIC POLICY

Robert Kenny*

When Sir Francis Bacon wrote that just as it is in the nature of light to be pure it is in the nature of science to be innocent, he gave to the pursuit of scientific knowledge and, by extension, technological development a firm, sure sense of purpose that has not wavered in subsequent centuries. Modern Western culture has accepted as axiomatic that scientific knowledge must be pursued as far as possible in every direction possible. The pursuit of knowledge is assumed to be intrinsically moral, thus relieving the investigator from any scruples about the uses to which his findings are put. But in giving all problems equal validity, the investigator becomes in fact amoral; he is a problem-solver whose talents are at the disposal of whatever sector of society will pose problems and offer the means of pursuing the investigation. The fact that in Western Europe and America it has been the industrial-technological structure that has posed problems and provided rewards has

³ The relation here is a complex one. There is no question that public policy is influenced by the work of the artists and humanists, particularly those who direct mass culture media. But my interest here is in the policy-relevant role: social philosophers and historians are notoriously and by training reactive. There is nothing in their education which makes them better predictors of future events than anyone else. Nor are they, by training, better managers of events than others. The primary use of historians and philosophers will continue to be the interpretation of cultural events as they happen, and possible futures as they relate to present/past realities.

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produced the fruitful and portentous union of interests that gives shape and texture to modern life. Technological science sees it as its mission, as William Leiss puts it, to "build all the possible machines," and all of us who are members of the society shaped by technology have learned to think of our futures in terms of the impact of technology. Public policy in the 20th century has become in large measure concerned with the adaptation and adjustment of human affairs to a changing technological state.

Bacon's faith in the intellectual purity of scientific investigation gave standing and respectability in Western society to a far more profound impulse--to act first and sort out the consequences later. Since earliest known times, it has been man's practice to undertake whatever actions his physical and technological capabilities would sustain without troubling himself about their implications. We develop nuclear weaponry and send space vehicles to Mars for the same reasons that we climb mountains, not because we need to but because we can. Because we can, we feel that we must, and we rely on our technological skills to extricate ourselves from any unpleasant consequences that might follow. Historically, our heedlessness has led us into circumstances of increasing complexity and fragility without shaking our confidence that something will always be found to turn catastrophe into triumph.

Because scientific, technological, and economic enterprises are essentially amoral, and because their interactions constitute the nexus of our society, there has been little place for raising fundamental questions of direction, consequence, and implication. Here, to me, is the role forced upon the humanist. I am not persuaded that public policy, especially that policy which is made necessary because of the technological aspects of military, political, and economic affairs, is often formed after consideration of precedent, example, context, and implication. (I suspect, indeed, that policy often is not "formed" at all, that it is simply an expression of a current perception of what can be done.) To the historian, the philosopher, the critic is left the frustrating, negative, and tiresome task of sounding alarms, calling for precautions, demanding that implications be considered. At the same time, there is no doubt in my mind that the task is an essential one; the critical problem is creating the means by which it can be institutionalized, so that policy can perhaps begin to overcome its historic heedlessness.

MONITORING THE DIRECTION AND RATE OF SOCIAL CHANGE THROUGH
THE ANTICIPATORY ASSESSMENT FUNCTION: SOME IMPLICATIONS
FOR PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

Louis H. Mayo*

ABSTRACT

We Americans seem always to have been impressed by scientific excellence, technical ingenuity, and industrial efficiency. Only recently has a substantial segment of the public become aware that something less than a full social accounting of the results of our technical proficiency is being recorded. Technology has been a huge success in achieving planned objectives and related beneficially perceived first order effects with respect to such social functions as transportation and communications. Technology has had a tremendous impact on the shaping of social values and the development of institutional processes designed to promote or regulate technically based activities.

A high level of industrialism has been achieved through individual initiative and technical proficiency. But some shift in social value priorities is now apparent. Economic efficiency (industrial productivity) and technological innovation must now adjust to a wider range of social concerns. Demands are insistent for greater social equality, for minimum assured basic rights and economic/social opportunities, for conservation of scarce resources, and for a liveable social environment for all.

In brief, technology has helped shape major conditions of our evolving society: its mobility and the values attached thereto; its interdependence of function; and the expanding regulatory and administrative bureaucracy. Whether technology has improved the conditions for the effective operation of the democratic process is questionable.

It is argued in this paper that social constraints on scientific advance and the process of technological innovation can become severe unless procedures are developed which will provide understandable and warrantable assessments of the full scope of social benefits and costs to be anticipated from proposed scientific/technological initiatives. Hence, social systems modeling supported by our most advanced techniques of inquiry and analysis seems an inevitable development. Social problem analysis will require the full integration of the entire panoply of intellectual disciplines. Many professionals and academic scholars will be attracted by this interdisciplinary, problem-oriented approach rather than to traditional academic laissez-faire research. Furthermore, all of the recognized professions will increasingly give attention to understanding the process of policy formulation and program implementation. Failure to do so in the context of increasing demands for social

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accountability will result in unnecessary and frustrating delays in the overall process of scientific advance and technological innovation. Hence, academic programs designed to integrate knowledge and analytical skills so as to contribute more effectively to monitoring the direction and rate of social change will likely become a strong component of the educational process along with the conventional function of knowledge specialization.

TECHNOLOGICAL HUMANISM

William Schmidt*

"Over the next few decades--before the end of this century--mankind will have to face and resolve challenges that may well determine the shape of its life for centuries to come, if not its very survival. There is no doubt that many of these challenges are a result of the rapid growth and cumulative effect of science and technology. There is also no doubt that they are bringing into direct confrontation what many men have tried to separate--fact and value. One aspect of this is that science and morality have been brought face to face. But what I believe will result from this confrontation, albeit after the period of anxiety and agony we seem to have entered, will ultimately be a united force to raise men to a new level of rationality and humanity."
--Glenn Seaborg
(Fourteenth Nobel Symposium)

The achievements of early technology, which were divorced from science, were laboriously constructed from discoveries attained by trial and error. In contrast, the achievements of modern technology are built largely from the systematic application of scientific knowledge. Thus the technology of modern times has become scientific technology. Since scientific technology possesses monumental power for benefit or harm, the long-range impact of every technological undertaking must be evaluated. The resultant evaluation gives every technological venture an ethical dimension.

Until recently technological forecasters concentrated on the prediction of future technologies by extrapolation from known concepts of science and technology. Critics complained that this practice leads technologists to view the "limits of the possible" as the guide to "things to come": Whatever can be invented will be invented. During the past decade this vision of the irrevocability of the emergence of particular technologies has been modified by the practice of technological assessment: Investigators estimate the consequences--good and bad--that might result from the development of a given technology in order to provide a basis for choice.

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Value judgments are imbedded in any choice to adopt, modify, or withhold a technology. The control of desirable and undesirable consequences of a technology raises new ethical questions for decision makers, and requires long-term social commitment to the decisions. Today we recognize that the development of any scientific technology generates complex problems and issues of public policy of a kind that were seldom, if ever, encountered before this era.

Traditionally, the humanities have explored the many facets of the human condition. Literary, philosophic, and historical humanists alike have shown a special concern for the examination of human values, ends, and standards. This humanistic perspective is exactly the outlook that social critics agree should govern the design of our public policies. Hence the humanities and the sciences should form an alliance to educate policy and decision makers. At the core of this education should be the determination to make technology and its related social institutions serve the fundamental needs and purposes of humankind.

For their part, the sciences should at the very least provide a factual foundation for alternative choices among technologies. Beyond this minimum contribution, the sciences can offer their own fruitful system of professional values as a partial basis for a human ethic--as proposed by such scientist/humanists as Jacob Bronowski, George Sarton, Michael Polanyi, and Rene Dubos. In turn, the humanities must promote those human values which are not directly cultivated by scientific strategies--for example, "the values of tenderness, of kindness, and of human intimacy and love."

Choices should be considered from a comprehensive, interdisciplinary viewpoint. Whole situations--not just abbreviated, arbitrary abstractions from the whole--should be examined. For this task a significant number of non-scientists and scientists from a variety of disciplines should learn a reasonable fraction of the content and the methods of both the humanities and the sciences. Working together, the humanities and the sciences can hope to establish what Sir Eric Ashby has called technological humanism. For technological humanism the criterion for choice will always be the balance of the favorable versus the unfavorable effects on the quality of human life.

A number of teachers at GWU have been able to participate outside their departments in a variety of humanistic, interdisciplinary programs for faculty and students. My own involvement outside the Chemistry Department in several of these programs has convinced me that the resources exist to make significant progress toward the humanistic education advocated in this discussion.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

Federal patronage first to the natural scientists and then to the social scientists because of their presumed usefulness to the achievement of national purposes in the mid-twentieth century is only the latest, albeit most painful, indication to academic humanists that they are perceived as marginal to the main business of modern society. Some humanists, sad to say, know history so imperfectly as to imagine that it has always been so and proceed to try to make a virtue of their uselessness.

The fact is, of course, that it was not always so. In the opening generations of the Renaissance, humanities scholars played central roles in the formulation and execution of state business in the Italian principalities. The indifference of the majority of those humanists to the emerging disciplines of science facilitated the separation of questions of fact from questions of value which still haunts us. The subsequent bourgeois, democratic and industrial revolutions each contributed to the progressive displacement of the humanist from positions of influence over the conduct of public life.

In the first plenary session of the workshop devoted to discussion of the papers which had been circulated in advance of the meeting, Prof. Joseph Slade of Long Island University opened a lively debate by referring directly to the "sense of impotence" and "fear of obsolescence" which appear to be characteristic of many humanists today. He suggested that our alienation is in large part our own doing, and in any event the resultant defensive quality of most humanistic critiques of technological modernity he finds unattractive and unconstructive.

Slade's own position as outlined represented a quite different perspective on our plight. In his assessment, "technology is at least as humanizing as it is dehumanizing." Moreover, he sketched a profile of the humanist as "incipient technologist" and as a good "processor of information," definitions which should facilitate our participation in policy-making and policy studies. In his view the well-trained humanist can do his "information processing" in a great many fields or subjects without retraining. This was consistent with his notion of the humanist as the supreme generalist, a scholar accustomed to dealing with variables of great complexity, especially "cultural influences that so bedevil policy studies."

This emphasis on the methodological skills of the humanist--rather than on his allegedly unique care for value judgments and historical perspectives--provoked the most critical responses to Slade from other humanists at the workshop. Slade countered that this objection reflected a limited way of thinking about the role of values. He asserted that the gathering and shaping of information is the making of moral statements.

People from various disciplines challenged Slade's claim for the humanist as generalist by definition. In the give-and-take of a spontaneous discussion, there was not time to differentiate and describe processes of generalization as done in different disciplines. Slade of

course did not deny that social scientists and natural scientists make generalizations which encompass immense ranges of data, but he may have suggested that there is a necessary loss of concreteness in the modes of analysis performed in other disciplines which is not true of the work of the humanistic generalist.

The spirit of the paper presented by Prof. Robert Baum of Rennselaer Polytechnic Institute was perceived by the group to be continuous with Slade's contribution, and he was interrogated in a similarly vigorous manner. Baum, far more than most humanists, has lived and worked in the camp of "the others"--an experience which he found not only challenging but rewarding. He was surprised, as a consequence, to be charged by some members of the workshop with having manifested in his paper a significant degree of hostility toward those who specialize in quantitative analyses.

He, like Slade, was rather upbeat as to possible roles for humanists in the realm of the policy-makers, if only they can accept non-mystical definitions of their potential contributions. He argued, quite unequivocally, that the anxiety among humanists as to their "relevance" and "utility" is groundless. There is no need, he said, to seek arbitrary or contrived applications of our traditions: simply recognize that they exist.

However, Baum denied that this means that humanists can become "experts" in other fields. He argued that becoming a professional academic in any field is not just a matter of acquiring specific knowledge but of gaining an overall worldview and identity through a specialized socialization. To become a "historian," for example, is the result of a process which cannot be by-passed or even significantly telescoped.

On the other hand, Baum maintained that humanists should not insist on finished, consensus definitions of themselves, of their character and skills, before becoming active participants in the policy process. As for who is a "humanist," he recommended that we simply take the working description used by NEH embodied in the legislation which established that agency.

Baum went on to claim a kind of indispensability for the potential contributions of the humanities scholar. This was perceived by some as an intimation of superior wisdom derived from "basic sensitivities" and "modes of awareness" generic to humanities training. That implication, if intended, was challenged sharply, particularly but not only by the social scientists present.

Baum, however, insisted that he was not trying to displace or demote those presently active in the policy field but only to make a place for the humanities scholar. His key concern is to get "an added perspective" into the policy-making process. He repeatedly stressed the "need for heterogeneity of input." His conviction as to the value of this was so strong that he urged a deliberate "selling" of the humanities scholar to the policy bureaucracy. The interesting rationale for this campaign reintroduced the presupposition of some irreducible special quality in humanists, but as described by Baum this distinctive identity seemed to

derive more from a broad socialization process than from uniqueness of method or content.

At the end of the evening in which Professors Slade and Baum spoke to their papers, it was evident that many participants were still waiting to hear a thoroughly satisfying answer to what they regarded as the prolegomenous question of the workshop: What is the distinctive competence of the humanist, the perspective which he alone can bring to policy studies?

The third principal speaker, Prof. Thomas Cook of Northwestern University, was the only social scientist among the three. Cook specializes in evaluation research, an activity which he defined as the attempt to give a precise account of both intended and actual consequences of a given public policy and its implementing program.

As can be seen from the text of his paper reproduced elsewhere in this report, Cook introduced two examples from current evaluation research as evidence for his thesis that empirical evaluation and humanistic perspectives can be mutually enriching. (However, it developed in the discussion that Cook sees the necessary preparation for participation in that dialogue to be more rigorous than was suggested by Slade. In Cook's view, if the humanist is to be able to evaluate social scientific information he must first gain a "deep acquaintance" with the methodology of the social sciences because it is the procedures of analysis which confer validity in those disciplines.)

The example of the Sesame Street TV program very sharply portrayed the inescapability of value judgments in policy decision-making. The analysis of its various educational impacts raises issues of public intent regarding the operational definition of equality of educational opportunity in a pluralistic society that exhibits social and economic inequalities that are educationally significant. The decision response to this analysis, Cook asserted, cannot be made on the basis of the data alone. Any policy decision will necessarily represent a value choice.

This apparent opening for a contribution from humanists was, however, rather severely qualified in a subsequent exchange. Cook restated the point by saying that in evaluation research it is "beyond question" that there must be "smart people of sensibility and sensitivity to value questions in order to complete the job of evaluation." This might even be termed a "necessary condition" of good evaluation research. But, he continued, it is "not so important that they be card-carrying humanists; the important variable is that they are smart and are sensitive to a wide range of issues."

Cook's second example, the analysis of crimes perpetrated on elderly Americans, was intended to illustrate the other movement of the dialectic, the way in which social science data can "edit" the claims and concerns of the humanist. In this instance the data appears to correct the lay or impressionistic view that the elderly suffer proportionately more and undergo more serious crimes. Therefore, those who interpret crime against the elderly as evidence of a breakdown of traditional values are not supported by empirical studies. Cook anticipated some objections to this line of analysis, but perhaps not the

intensity of the reaction which was forthcoming. The focus of the comments by humanists was a challenge to the adequacy of the definition of suffering both in a subjective sense and in terms of the cultural dimensions of society's concern for the elderly. Perhaps this exchange documented the need for the articulation of a humanistic perspective in the initial stages of the development of research designs which are intended to measure issues of human significance.

A brief workshop on a relatively new topic cannot be expected to arrive at detailed resolutions or systematic conclusions, and this one did not. If nothing else, the vitality of the disagreements proved the need for many more occasions for this kind of conversation. There must be the opportunity to identify real worries and to distinguish them from unnecessary ones. The participation of humanists in policy studies represents a novel focus in modern university life, and the requisite habits of communication with those more experienced in policy work have yet to be developed.

Those who intend to go further in the exploration of this topic will surely have to deal with two sets of issues which were most prominent and persistent in this workshop: one dealing with values and one with interdisciplinarity.

(1) Humanists must learn to articulate their concern for values in a manner which demonstrates their concrete connection with practical affairs. Only then can we talk helpfully about the relationship(s) of empirical and normative considerations in policy formulation and evaluation. Many humanists no doubt are motivated to enter this field by an admirable moral concern for matters of public policy. But is there some necessary connection between that concern and their academic traditions? Does it arise from or is it shaped by the fact of one's being a historian or philosopher or teacher of literature?

(2) How do we overcome the institutional obstacles and epistemological difficulties in the way of significant interdisciplinarity? How much of what must the humanist know in order to participate usefully in policy studies? What can academic humanists contribute to the education of those who are to become professionals in the policy field?

There was extended consideration of the teaching of policy studies in the two small discussion group meetings. It is of the nature of such conversations, however, that they cannot be reproduced in a form that would be meaningful to those who were not participants. But more than that, to expect too much along this line is premature. Until more people have had the chance to work through the fundamental conceptual problems in a more sustained way, most of us are not in a position to make pedagogical recommendations with confidence. In this stage of the development of the field, a reflective sharing of experiences and testing of ideas may be the most appropriate activity. If so, this workshop was a useful event for those who took part.

RSF

WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

Attending From Other Institutions

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 Joseph Brent, Chairman of the History Department, University of the District of Columbia
 Peter Conn, Associate Professor of English, University of Pennsylvania
 H. Rosalind Cowie, Assistant Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, Georgetown University
 William J. Farrell, Assistant Director of the Humanities Program, St. Anselm's College
 Sarel P. Fuchs, Assistant Professor of Education and Classics, Albright College
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 John W. Willoughby, Professor of English and Vice-President for Academic Affairs, Saint Francis College

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